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ABSTRACT
The notion of a fully homomorphic encryption scheme over integers with public key
compression has been proposed by Coron. The main attractive feature of this scheme
is the reduction of the public key size, which is obtained by encrypting the plaintext
with a quadratic form in the public key elements instead of in a linear form. In this
work, we adopt this technique and apply it to the hidden ideal lattice scheme to acquire
a more efficient scheme based on the hidden ideal lattice. The security of our scheme
is based on the bounded distance decoding over the hidden ideal lattice. Additionally,
we also describe a variant of the scheme with higher degrees. The scheme shows a
better level of efficiency in comparison to the original scheme.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Post-quantum cryptography aims to construct cryptographic algorithms which is se-
cure against an attack by a quantum computer. There are three algorithms with their
security relies on hard mathematical problems: the integer factorization problem, the
discrete logarithm problem or the elliptic-curve discrete logarithm problem. Under
the current electronic computer, these algorithms are hard to solve, however, they can
be solved by quantum computer easily by running Shor’s algorithm [60]. Symmetric
cryptographic algorithms and hash functions in the public-key system are considered
to be relatively secure against attacks by quantum computers [2].
Post-quantum cryptography is using quantum phenomena to achieve secrecy and
detect eavesdropping. There are six categories of algorithms based on different hard
mathematical problems.
• Latticed-based cryptography: the cryptographic system includes Learning with
Errors, Ring-Learning with Errors (Ring-LWE), the Ring Learning with Errors
Key Exchange and the Ring Learning with Errors Signature, the older NTRU or
GGH encryption schemes, and the newer NTRU signature and BLISS signatures
[49].
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• Multivariate cryptography: thistype of cryptographic system includes the Rain-
bow scheme [21]. Rainbow also could provides a quantum secure multivariate
signature schemes which called Rainbow Signature Scheme [21].
• Hash-based cryptography: the cryptographic system includes Lamport signa-
tures and the Merkle signature scheme. The most familiar hash based digital
signatures like RSA and DSA .
• Code-based cryptography: the cryptographic system is based on error-correcting
codes, the McEliece and Niederreiter encryption algorithms are two classic algo-
rithms [47].
• Supersingular elliptic curve isogeny cryptography: the cryptographic system re-
lies on the properties of supersingular elliptic curves. to create a Diffie-Hellman
replacement with forward secrecy. Diffie-Hellman like key exchange has better
performance to resist quantum computing than the Diffie-Hellman and elliptic
curve DiffieHellman key exchange methods [23].
• Symmetrickey-based cryptography: Grover’s algorithm is the best quantum at-
tack against generic symmetric-key systems. These approach is more effective in
small key size for post-quantum cryptography [34].
To prove the security of a cryptographic algorithm is equivalent to prove the math-
ematical problem is hard. The procedure of proves is called ”security reductions”.
The security of given cryptographic algorithms above are reduced to the security of
different known hard problems.
• Ring-LWE Signature: the security reduction of RLWE is the shortest-vector
problem (SVP) in a lattice as a lower bound on the security which is NP-hard
problem [40].
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• NTRU, BLISS: the security reduction of these two algorithms are the closest-
vector problem (CVP) in a lattice as a lower bound on the security which is also
NP-hard problem [22].
• Rainbow: multivariate quadratic equation cryptosystems called ”Unbalanced Oil
and Vinegar Cryptosystems” is NP-hard problem. The Rainbow Multivariate
Equation Signature Scheme is a class of multivariate quadratic equation cryp-
tosystems. The Rainbow Multivariate Equation Signature Scheme is equivalent
to NP-hard problem [8].
• Merkle signature scheme: one-way hash functions is a well known hard problem.
The security reduction of Merkle Hash Tree signatures has proved to relies on
one-way hash function [24].
• McEliece: the Syndrome Decoding Problem (SDP) is also known to be NP-hard
problem. The security reduction of McEliece Encryption System is SDP [59].
• Supersingular elliptic curve isogeny cryptography: Unlike other cryptosystems,
this system has no security reduction to a known NP-hard problem. Delfs and
Galbraith indicates the difficulty of the problem is as hard as the inventors of the
key exchange which relies on constructing an isogeny between two supersingular
curves with the same number of points [18].
A lattice L in real analysis is a set of points in the n-dimensional Euclidean space
Rn with a strong periodicity property. A basis of L is a set of vectors is represented
by the linear combination of any element with integer coefficients uniquely. Due to
the property of the cryptosystems, the ciphertext, public key, and private key must
be taken from a finite space, therefore, the lattices used for cryptography is over the
finite field only. The most two famous mathematical problems based on the lattices
are the Shortest Vector Problem (SVP) and the Closest Vector Problem (CVP) [1].
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Both are hard to solve without a good basis, the security of algorithm relies on the
hard problem to find the good basis. The effective method to find the good basis
(nearly orthogonal vectors) is using lattice basis reduction. If one can compute such
a lattice basis, the CVP and SVP problems are easy to solve. The LLL algorithm is
a quite effective to compute good basis, and so many alternative algorithms based on
LLL algorithm to run faster or more efficiency [53].
The notion of fully homomorphic encryption scheme has been known to be very
useful in the cloud computing environment, ciphertext retrieval and secure multi-
party computation [13]. In 1978, Rivest, Adleman and Dertouzos [55] introduced
the basic concept of privacy homomorphism which allows computation on encrypted
data without decryption. They posed the construction of privacy homomorphism
(and hence, fully homomorphic encryption) as an open research problem. A scheme
is called to be fully homomorphic if it can operate on the ciphertext without the
knowledge of the secret key. For any valid function f and plaintext m, the operation
on ciphertexts is equivalent to the same operation on plaintext. In such a definition,
given a function f and a ciphertext c which encrypt a plaintext m, it is able to transfer
c into a new ciphertext c′ witch encrypts f(m). There have been many attempts to
achieve this goal. Some of them can satisfy the additive homomorphism only or the
multiplicative homomorphism only, and meanwhile some other schemes have been
successful on enabling both operations with limited level of operations. The ’Polly
Cracker’ scheme can evaluate arbitrary level operation in any circuit. Nevertheless, the
size of ciphertext will increase exponentially with the depth of the circuit [64]. We note
that none of these scheme is fully homomorphic scheme. The first breakthrough has
been provided by Gentry in his construction of the first fully homomorphic encryption
in 2009 [25]. Due to the characteristic of the addition and multiplication over Z2,
which forms a complete set of those operations, the scheme can evaluate the operation
5
on encrypted data in polynomial time.
Gentrys approach on achieving fully homomorphic encryption is achieved by in-
corporating the bootstrapping technique, which seems to be the inherent efficiency
bottleneck [28]. This is the primary reason why fully homomorphic encryption scheme
cannot be adopted in practice yet. The natural fully homomorphic encryption scheme
has not been found so far, majority schemes are proposed by Gentry’s first idea: con-
structed a somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme first, then applied the squash
on the decryption algorithm, finally used the bootstrapping technique to achieve the
fully homomorphic encryption scheme [26].
To construct a somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme means construct a
scheme with a limited number of homomorphic operations. The somewhat homomor-
phic of Gentry’s framework is s GGH cryptosystem which based on the ideal lattice.
There are two kinds of basis, one is ’good’ basis which can be used as the secret key,
another basis is ’bad’ for the public key [26]. The underlying lattice problem is a
bounded distance decoding problem over ideal lattice. The encryption is mapping a
message to a vector close to the lattice by using the bas basis witch is public key, the
decryption is reducing the vector to the message buy using the good basis which is
secret key.
During the evaluations, since the noise of the ciphertext is expanded over the
bound especially in multiplicative operation, it occurs the failure in the decryption.
Gentry used ’homomorphic decryption’ to control the noise increasing. Encrypt the
ciphertext and the corresponding public key by evaluate key, and input the result
into the decryption circuit, output a new ciphertext. If the error of ciphertext is
able to evaluate one more time especially in multiplication after each operation, then
the ciphertext can perform unlimited times operation [28], [30]. Since the somewhat
homomorphic encryption scheme can only perform limited operations with low-degree
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polynomials, the next step is to squash the decryption procedure so that it can be
expressed as a low-degree polynomial which is supported by the scheme. Finally the
application of a bootstrapping can transform the somewhat homomorphic encryption
scheme to a fully homomorphic scheme [26].
There are three categories of fully homomorphic encryption scheme: ideal lattice
based scheme, integer based scheme and learning with error based scheme. Smart and
Vercauteren [62] used the principle ideal lattice to construct the fully homomorphic
scheme. They selected two integer to represent the lattice and maintained a smaller
key size. The integer based scheme proposed by van Dijk [20], where its security is
based on the approximate greatest common factor. Plantard, Susilo and Zhang [50]
proposed the notion of hidden ideal lattice for the construction of fully homomorphic
encryption schemes. The hidden ideal lattice scheme unifies ideal lattice scheme and
integer scheme. Instead of publishing the lattice, they used vectors close to a lattice
which is called the hidden ideal lattice. The security of the hidden ideal lattice scheme
relies on a bounded distance decoding problem over hidden ideal lattice rather than
the subset sum problem.
The implementation of the fully homomorphic encryption scheme by van Dijk et al.
[20] shows that the public key size is too big for any practical system [29]. Reducing
the size of the public key is the key point to make the scheme more practical, which is
achieved by shortening the length or decreasing the number of public keys [57]. Coron
proposed a technique to reduce the number of public, then shrunk the size of the public
key based on the scheme over the integers [15].
Our Contributions Since Coron’s scheme is over the integers, his work can be
reduced to the AGCD problem, the attacker can recover the noise or public key by
lattice reduction. We choose Plantard, Susilo and Zhang’s hidden ideal lattice scheme
to combine the bounded distance decoding problem (BDD) with approximate greatest
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common divisor problem. Therefore, the scheme based on the ideal lattice gives a
stronger security by the hardness of problems. Coron’s technique can be applied on
the the Plantard, Susilo and Zhang’s hidden ideal lattice scheme, which improves
the efficiency exponentially by smaller size of public key. The less public key we
publish, the less information of the public key or noise will be leaked. In this work,
we are to construct a somewhat homomorphic scheme with public key compression
on hidden ideal lattice. Our approach is summarized as follows. We first generate
a random polynomial vector as the ring element, then divide these vectors into two
groups. Then, we choose a vector from each group and the product of two polynomial.
Therefore, the original public key will be replaced by the new quadratic key. The
scheme can reduce the number of public key from τ keys to 2
√
τ keys. We also extend
the technique into higher degrees to reduce the public key size further. The efficiency
can improve for shorter time consuming and less space in public key storage.
Chapter 2
Backgroud
In this section, we will provide the backgroud of research on three disciplines: Lattice,
Public-Key Cryptosystems, and Fully Homomorphic Encryption.
2.1 Notation
The parameters that are used in the scheme are as follows:
• λ: security parameter.
• ρ: the norm of random noise vector.
• η: the bit length of the norm of generating polynomial (secret vector).
• γ: the bit length of the norm of the random multiplier vector.
• τ : the number of vectors in the public key in encryption algorithm.
• β: the number of vectors in the public key.
• ζ: the norm of noise used in encryption.
• n: the dimension of the hidden lattice.
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• θ: the constant factor depending on the polynomial.
For integers z and d, denote [z]d as the z mod d with in (−d/2, d/2] and dzc as the
closest integer to d. Recall the definition of the integer residue ring Zn = Z/nZ,
the element in the residue ring is generated by modular operation which in the set
{0, 1, 2, . . . , n − 1}. For x Mod n ≡ y, y is defined as y ≡ x mod n with the interval
(−n
2
, n
2
]. D is a distribution by parameter γ and ρ, Dγ,ρ(p) := {choose q ← Z ∩
[0, q0), e← Z ∩ (−2ρ, 2ρ) : output x = pq + e}.
Denote the vector v to represent the coefficient of polynomial f(x). Let the poly-
nomial f(x) in the form of V ec(f(x)) =
∑n−1
i=0 vix
i, denote vector v =< v1, . . . , vn >,
where vi represents the coefficient of element of x
i. For two vectors v1 and v2, de-
note v1 × v2 be the polynomial multiplication over the ring, v1 × v2 = V ec(v1(x) ×
v2(x) mod f(x).
2.2 Lattice
Based on introduction of lattices by Micciancio, Nguyen and Lenstra, this section will
give the definition, proofs and properties of lattice.
2.2.1 Definition
Let Rn be the n-dimensional Euclidean vector. x and y are denoted as column vectors
like x = (x1, . . . , xn)
T and y = (y1, . . . , yn)
T in Rn. The Euclidean inner product is de-
noted by < x, y > =
∑n
i=1 xiyi, and the corresponding norm is ‖x‖ =
√
x21 + · · ·+ x2n.
The distance between two vectors is d(x, y) = ‖x −y ‖. The distance between a vector
x ∈ Rn and a subset E ⊂ Rn is defined as dicst(x,E) = miny∈E {d(x, y)}.
Definition 2.2.1. (Lattice)[53] Lattice is the set of integer combinations of n linearly
independent vectors v1, . . . .vn in Rn. Denote the set of vectors v1, . . . , vn as the basis
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of the lattice.
L(v1, . . . , vn) = {
n∑
i=1
vibi : vi ∈ Z for 1 ≤ i ≤ n},
In the matrix notation, B = [v1, . . . ,vn] ∈ Rn×n denotes as the basis for lattice
L(B) = {Bx : x ∈ Zn}. The determinant of a lattice is det(L) =
√
B×BT.
Definition 2.2.2. (Norm)[53] Let v =< v1, . . . , vn >∈ Rn be the vector of lattice, the
Euclidean norm is defined as ‖v‖ =
√∑n
i=1 v
2
i . For two vectors v1, v2 ∈ Rn, we have
‖v1 + v2‖ ≤ ‖v1‖+ ‖v2‖, and ‖v1 × v2‖ ≤ θ · ‖v1‖ · ‖v2‖, where θ =
√
n.
Definition 2.2.3. (Ideal Lattice)[42] An ideal lattice L(Rot(v, f)) over a polynomial
ring Z[X]/f , f ∈ Z[X] is a monic irreducible polynomial of degree n. Rot(v, f) is the
rotation matrix where the i−th row of this matrix equals to the coefficients of v×xi−1
mod f .
Plantard, Susilo and Zhang constructed a fully homomorphic encryption scheme
by using hidden ideal lattice [50]. The hidden ideal lattice scheme is unified by two
schemes which are ideal lattice based schemes and integer based schemes. The security
of the scheme does not rely on the sparse subset sum problem (SSSP), but rather, it
relies on the bounded distance decoding problem (BDD) of ideal lattices.
Definition 2.2.4. (Hidden Ideal Lattice)[50] Let α ∈ R+ be a positive real, vi ∈ Zn
be τ integer vectors such that there exists a unique (ideal) lattice L and some unique
vectors vi ∈ L respecting ∀1 ≤ i ≤ τ , dist(vi, wi) ≤ α. Then L is called an α−hidden
ideal lattice hidden under {vi}. For a vector v ∈ Rn and a lattice L, the distance
between the two, denoted by dist(v, L) = min(‖v − u‖), ∀u ∈ L.
Definition 2.2.5. (BDD over Hidden Ideal Lattice) [50] Let γ ∈ R+ be a positive
real. Let L be an n dimensional ideal lattice, and v ∈ Z such that there exists a unique
vector u ∈ L satisfying dist(v, u) ≤ γ. The γ-Bounded Distance Decoding problem
over ideal lattice, denoted by γ −BDDHIn, is to find u, given a basis of L and v.
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Definition 2.2.6. (Dec BDD over Hidden Ideal Lattice) [50] Let γ ∈ R+ be a positive
real. Let L be an n dimensional ideal lattice, and v ∈ Z. The decisional γ-Bounded
Distance Decoding problem over ideal lattice, denoted by Dec γ − BDDHIn, is to
decide if there exists a unique vector u ∈ L satisfying dist(v, u) ≤ γ. or not, given a
basis of L and v.
Definition 2.2.7. (Subset Sum Problem) [50] Let {c1, c2, . . . , cn} be a set of positive
integers. Let c =
∑n
i=1 sici, where si ∈ {0, 1} . Let d ←
∑n
i=1 si. The subset sum
problem, denoted by d, n-SSP, is to find {si}, given {ci} and c.
2.3 Lattice Computational Problems
To prove the security of algorithms, we introduce several classic computational prob-
lems which based on lattices computation in this section. Then we review the lattice
application on cryptosystem with LWE and R-LWE.
Definition 2.3.1. (Classic Lattice Problems) [41], [51]
• Decisional Shortest Vector Problem (GapSVPγ): Given a basis B of a full-
rank n-dimensional lattice L, decide if λ1(L) ≤ 1 or λ1(L) > γ(n).
• Shortest Independent Vectors Problem (SIVPγ): Given a basis B of a full-
rank n-dimensional lattice L, find a set of linearly independent vectors S =
{s1, . . . , sn}, for si ∈ L(B), minimizing the quantity ‖S‖ = maxi∈[n]‖si‖.
Definition 2.3.2. (Modern Lattice Problems) [51], [53]
• Small Integer Solutions (SISβ): Given a prime q, a random matrix A ∈ Zn×mq
and a real number β. Find a non-zero vector d ∈ Zm such that Ad = 0 mod q
and ‖d‖ ≤ β. Note, finding a solution of SISβ can be seen as finding a short
lattice point in lattice Λ⊥q (A).
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Lemma 2.3.1. (Average-case to Worst-case) [44], [52] Let n, p ≥ 1 be some integers
and χ be some disribution on Zp. Assume that we have access to a distinguisher W
that distinguishes As,χ from U for a non-negligible fraction of all possible s, then there
exists an efficient algorithm W ′ that for all s accepts with probability exponentially
close to 1 on inputs from U.
Lemma 2.3.2. (Decision to Search) [52] Let n ≥ 1 be some integers, 2 ≤ p ≤ poly(n)
be a prime, and χ be some distribution on Zp. Assume that we have access to procedure
W that for all s accepts with probability exponentially close to 1 on inputs from As,χ
and rejects with probability exponentially close to 1 on inputs from U. Then, there
exists an efficient algorithm W ′ that, given samples from As,χ for some s, outputs s
with probability exponentially close to 1.
Lemma 2.3.3. (Discrete to Continuous) [52] Let n, p ≥ 1 be some integers, let φ be
some probability density function on T, and let φ̄ be its discretisation to Zp. Assume
that we have access to an algorithm W that solves LWEp,φ̄. Then, there exists an
efficient algorithm W ′ that solves LWEp,φ.
2.3.1 Learning With Error (LWE)
Based on worst-case hardness assumption, the ”learning with error” problem is a
classical problem which is to distinguish random linear equations with small amount
of noise from uniform ones. The main theory is to recover a secret key s ∈ Znq given a
sequence of ”approximate” random linear equations on s. If without error, the secret
key s can be found by gaussian elimination in polynomial time. Introducing the small
error perturbs the linear combinations into nonlinear combinations, then the gaussian
elimination algorithm seems impossible to solve the problem directly
Definition 2.3.3. (GLWE) [5] For security parameter λ, let n = n(λ) is the dimension,
and the polynomial f(x) = xd + 1 with d is power of 2, fix q = q(λ) ≤ 2 as a prime
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integer, let R = Z[x]/(f(x)) and Rq = R/qR, and let χ = χ(λ) be a distribution
over R. The GLWEn,f,q,χ problem is to distinguish the following two distributions:
In the first distribution, one samples (ai, bi) uniformly from R
n+1
q . In the second
distribution, one first draws s ← Rnq uniformly and then samples (ai, bi) ∈ Rn+1q by
sampling ai ← Rnq uniformly, ei ← χ, and setting bi =< ai, s > +ei. The GLWEn,f,q,χ
assumption is that the GLWEn,f,q,χ problem is infeasible.
LWE is simply GLWE instantiated with d = 1 and RLWE is GLWE instantiated
with n = 1. The brief description of the LWE problem is, given a size parameter
n ≥ 1 and a modulus q ≥ 2, also given an error probability distribution χ on Zq.
Choose a random vector α ∈ Znq uniformly and e ∈ Zq according to χ, then output
(α,< α, s > +e) in Zq. The As,χ consists of independent and uniform random α.
The LWE problem can be considered as decoding from random linear codes. On the
lattice view, the LWE problem is decoding the code by a random bounded distance
[38]. The maximum likelihood algorithm is a way to solve the LWE problem with the
running time 2O(n logn). The best known algorithm for the LWE problem is Blum et
al. algorithm, and the running time is 2O(n) [9], [32], [46], [58]. Due to several reasons,
we believe the LWE problem is hard. The well known algorithm for solving the LWE
problem is running in exponential time. Next, the LWE problem is based on certain
assumptions regarding the worst-case hardness of standard lattice problems such as
GapSVP and SIVP on lattices. The ’dual’ problem of LWE problem is SIS problem.
The hardness of the SIS problem is also based on the worst-case lattice problem such
as SIVP and GapSVP [43], [44], [48].
Theorem 2.3.4. (Informal) [52] Let n, p be integer and α ∈ (0, 1) be such that αp >
2
√
n. If there exists an efficient algorithm that solves LWEp,Ψ̃α then there exists
an efficient quantum algorithm that approximates the decision version of the shortest
vector problem (GapSVP) and the shortest independent vectors problem (SIVP) to
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within Õ(n/α) in the worst case.
2.3.2 Ring-Learing With Error (R-LWE)
Normal LWE problem is defined over integers. It turns out the LWE problem over
some special rings is also hard. Due to the large size of key over the integers, the ring
structure allows LWE-based cryptosystems to have shorter public key size, which is
reduced to almost linear size from O(n2) to O(n) [40]. The structure in the Ring-LWE
of the NTRU cryptosystem is as follow. Choose a random vector α1 = (a1, a2, . . . , an)
uniformly on the ring Zq[x]/ < xn + 1 >, the rest of n − 1 vectors (a2, . . . , an) in the
form of ai = (ai, ai+1, . . . , an,−a1, . . . ,−ai−1) with n is the power of 2. Some schemes
do not require the xn + 1 has to be irreducible over the rational recently [40]. Fix
the s ∈ Rq as the secret key, α ∈ Rq chosen uniformly, and e is an error chosen from
the distribution over Rq. The sample forms as (α, b = α · s + e) ∈ Rq × Rq, where
each α is uniformly random and each inner product α · s is perturbed by a term draw
independently from the error distribution over R [40].
The hardness of the Ring-LWE problem is based on the worst-case lattice problem.
The goal is to recover the secret s from these samples. The main theory [48] is
Theorem 2.3.5. Suppose that it is hard for polynomial-time quantum algorithms to
approximate (the search version of) the shortest vector problem (SVP) in the worst
case on ideal lattices in R to within a fixed poly(n) factor. Then any poly(n) number of
samples drawn from the R-LWE distribution are pseudorandom to any polynomial-time
attacker.
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2.4 Public Key Cryptography
Public key cryptography is asymmetric cryptography. Any cryptographic system cre-
ates public key and private key in pairs. Public keys can be distributed widely, and
private keys are known to the owner only. Everyone can encrypted plaintext by public
key, and the ciphertext can be decrypted by owner’s private key. The strength of a
public key cryptography system relies on the difficulty of generating a private key from
its corresponding public key. Security depends only on keeping the private key pri-
vate, and the public key may be published without compromising security[61]. Public
key cryptographic algorithms are based on mathematical problems, such as integer
factorization, discrete logarithm, and elliptic curve relationships.
Diffie and Hellman [19] introduced a new approach for distributing the key informa-
tion over public insecure channels. Public key cryptosystem also known as asymmetric
key cryptosystem. Each user has two keys, one is a public encryption key another is
a private decryption key. The public key is generated by secret key with different
mathematical techniques, while the private key cannot be derived from the public key.
In other words, the public key is widely known and the secret key is only known to
the recipients. Messages are encrypted with the recipient’s public key and can only be
decrypted with the corresponding private key. The first implementation of the idea is
published by Rivest, Shamir and Adleman in 1977. It is also known as RSA algorithm
[56].
The LWE problem has been widely used in the public key cryptosystem. There is
an example of the application of LWE with public key cryptosystem, but the efficiency
needs to be improved [54].
• Private Key: Choose a random vector s uniformly from Znq .
• Public Key: The public key consists of m samples (αi, bi)mi=1 from the LWE
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distribution with secret s, modulus q, and error parameter α.
• Encryption: For each bit of the message, do the following. Choose a random set
S uniformly among all 2m subsets of [m]. The encrypttion is (
∑
i∈S αi,
∑
i∈S bi)
if the bit is 0 and (
∑
i∈S αi, b
q
2
c+
∑
i∈S bi) if the bit is 1.
• Decryption: The decryption of a pair(α, b) is 0 if b - < α, s > is closer to 0
than to b q
2
c modulo q, and 1 otherwise.
The correctness is obviously. It requires the error of s smaller than q/4, since
each error’s standard deviation is αq, the standard deviation of the sum is at most
√
mαq < q/ log n. The security is based on the decision-LWE problem. With very
high probability over the choice of (αi, bi)
m
i=1, the distribution over s of a random
subset sum (
∑
i∈S αi,
∑
i∈S bi) is extremely close to be uniform in statistical distance.
The encryptions of 0 or 1 is essentially identically distributed, the algorithm assuming
decision LWE is hard [32], [48]
The R-LWE is more widely and efficiently in real world. There is an example of
public key cryptosystem satisfying the semantically secure [40]. Fix the ring R =
Z[x]/ < xn + 1 > with the n is a power of 2.
• Secret Key: Choose a random vector s uniformly from R.
• Public Key: Then choose a uniformly random ring element α ∈ Rq, and another
small element e ∈ R from the error distribution. Output a pair (a, b = a · s+ e)
as the public key.
• Encryption: To encrypt n-bits binary message, choose three random elements
r, e1, e2 ∈ R from the error distribution.Output the cyphertext in pair (u, v) ∈ R2q,
where
u = a · r + e1 and v = b · r + e2 + bq/2e · z mod q
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• Decryption: The decryption computes
v − u · s = (r · e− sc · e1 + e2) + bq/2e · z mod q.
This application also requires the coefficient of the error item r · e− s · e1 + e2 ∈ R less
than q/4 [40].
2.5 Fully Homomorphic Encryption
2.5.1 The Definition of FHE
There are four algorithms: KeyGen, Encrypt, Decrypt and Evaluate. The first
three are the basic algorithm of public key encryption system and the evaluation
algorithm is the core algorithm of fully homomorphic encryption which performing
the operation of ciphertext. The algorithm is inputting a group ciphertext c =<
c1, c2, . . . , ct > which has been encrypted with plaintext into a circuit C, each circuit
C represents a function. The group of new output ciphertext can be decrypted to the
corresponding plaintext.
Definition 2.5.1. (Correct Homomorphic Decryption) [25] For any key-pair (pk, sk)
generated by algorithm KeyGen, any t-input circuit, any plaintext m1, . . . ,mt and
any ciphertext c1, . . . , ct with ci ← Encrypt(mi), if
Decrypt(sk,Evaluate(pk, C, c)) = C(m1, . . . ,mt)
exists, the scheme E =(KeyGen, Encrypt, Decrypt, Evaluate) is correct.
Definition 2.5.2. (Compact Homomorphic Decryption) [26] For any security param-
eter λ, if there exists a polynomial f , output length of the evaluate algorithm be most
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f(λ). The scheme E =(KeyGen, Encrypt, Decrypt, Evaluate) is compactness.
Definition 2.5.3. (Fully Homomorphic Decryption) [26] A scheme E is fully homo-
morphic if it is both compact and homomorphic for the class of all arithmetic circuit.
Definition 2.5.4. (Somewhat Homomorphic Decryption) [26] The encryption scheme
can handle circuits of depth roughly log logN − log log n, which means the maximum
depth of the permit circuits is greater than twice of the depth of decryption circuit.
Definition 2.5.5. (Fully Homomorphic Decryption) [26] A scheme E is fully homo-
morphic if it is both compact and homomorphic for the class of all arithmetic circuit.
Definition 2.5.6. (Leveled Fully Homomorphic Decryption) [26] For any d ∈ Z+, the
scheme E (d) with the same decryption circuit is compactness and the depth of circuit
is d. The complexity of the scheme E (d) is polynomial in λ, d. A family of schemes
E (d) is leveled homomorphic.
2.5.2 The Construction of FHE
The crucial point to construct a fully homomorphic encryption scheme being he scheme
is able to evaluate polynomials of higher degree, in other words, the decryption proce-
dure can be expressed as a polynomial of lower degree. Once the degree of polynomials
that can be evaluated by the scheme exceeds the degree of the decryption polynomial
(times two), the scheme is a fully homomorphic scheme [26].
There is no natural fully homomorphic encryption scheme so far, majority schemes
are constructed by Gentry’s idea. Firstly, construct a somewhat homomorphic en-
cryption scheme which is a linear error correcting code C on the ring R. Linear code
satisfies the additive homomorphism and error correcting code means the code with
an error. Since C is an ideal of the ring, it satisfies the multiplicative homomorphism.
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The code C has two kinds of basis, one is ’good’ basis which can be used as secret key,
another basis is ’bad’ for public key [26].
Since the error of the ciphertext will be expanded over the bound especially in
multiplication, it occurs the failure in the decryption. Gentry used ’homomorphic de-
cryption’ to control the noise increasing. Encrypt the ciphertext and the corresponding
public key by evaluate key, and input the result into the decryption circuit, output a
new ciphertext. If the error of ciphertext is able to evaluate one more time especially
in multiplication after each operation, then the ciphertext can perform unlimited times
operation [28], [30]. Since the somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme can only
perform limited operations with low-degree polynomials , the second step is to squash
the decryption procedure so that it can be expressed as a low-degree polynomial which
is supported by the scheme. Finally the application of a bootstrapping can transform
the somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme to a fully homomorphic scheme [26].
2.5.3 The Security of FHE
The SHE and FHE is secure against chosen plaintext attacks. But no SHE and FHE
scheme can be IND-CCA2 secure, based on the fact that the adversary is allowed
to manipulate the challenged ciphertext and submit it to the decryption oracle in
an IND-CCA2 attack. The IND-CCA1 has been proved to be not secure for FHE
and SHE scheme [39].Zhang provided a way to recovery the secret key by using the
decryption oracle over the DGHV scheme [65] [66]. Chenal give more algorithm to
allow an adversary to recover the pubic keys through decryption oracle queries [11].
2.5.4 Technique of Fully Homomorphic Encryption
The key point to construct fully homomorphic encryption is how to control the increase
of the noise, there are some techniques like key switching and modulus switching.
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2.5.4.1 Boostrapple
The fully homomorphic decryption requires the depth of decryption circuit less than
the depth of the decryption circuit of evaluate algorithm. In fact, the depth of decryp-
tion of circuit is greater than the depth of the decryption circuit of evaluate algorithm.
Using ’sub set sum phrase’ is the way to squash the depth of decryption circuit [26].
2.5.4.2 Homomrophic Decryption
Homomorphic decryption can generate new ciphertext and reduce the error of cipher-
text with conditions. Let Encrypt(pk1,m) → c1 and Encrypt(pk2, sk1j) → ¯sk1, the
algorithm of homomorphic decryption is:
Recrypt(pk2, D, ¯sk1, c1)
Encrypt(pk2, c1j)→ c̄1
Evaluate(pk2, D, ¯sk1, c̄1)→ c2
D is the circuit of decryption algorithm [26]. It decrypts the ciphertext after first
encryption witch eliminates the error, then encrypted by new public key to get new
ciphertext with new error. If the new error allows one more multiplication, in other
words, the error is still within the bound after multiplication, then the goal of homo-
morphic decryption is achieved [26].
2.5.4.3 Key Switching
Key switching technique is based on the LWE of R-LWE, it can generate a new cipher-
text corresponding to the different secret keys and reduce the dimension of ciphertext
[5]. The new ciphertext c2 is formed by a matrix M multiplying the fresh ciphertext
c1. The row of matrix M is the dimension of c1 and the column of M is the dimension
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of c2. The technique transform c1 with dimension n1 to c2 with dimension n2 with the
same modulus, the error of c2 increases < BitDecomp(c1), e2 > than the error of c1.
The algorithm is:
SwitchKeyGen(s1 ∈ Rn1q , s2 ∈ Rn2q ) : A← E.PublicKeyGen(s2, N)
B← A + Powersof2(s1),
( where N = n1 · dlog qe)
output τs1→s2 = B
SwitchKey(τs1→s2 , c1) : output c2 = BitDecomp(c1)
T ·B ∈ rn2q
2.5.4.4 Modulus Switching
Let the modulus be q = xk, and each ciphertext with error x, the new error is approx-
imately x2 after multiplication. The error will reach the bound of decryption circuit
after log k levels multiplicative. If the error times 1/x after each operation, the error
will be reduced to the original value, meanwhile, the modulus decrease to q/x [5]. The
Iteration can perform k levels without bootstrapping before reaching the bound of
error. The algorithm is :
Scale(c, q, p, r) : input s, q and p with (q > p > m)
output (p/q) · c and c′ = c mod r
2.5.4.5 Chinese Reminder Theorem
p1, . . . , p2 are pairwise co-prime integers and CRT(p1,...,p2)(m1, . . . ,mk) is a number in
Z ∩ (−π
2
, π
2
], where π =
∏k
i=1 pi. CRT(p1,...,p2)(m1, . . . ,mk) is equivalent to mi mod pi
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for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k} . So we have
CRT(p1,...,p2)(m1, . . . ,mk) =
k∑
i=1
miMi(M
−1
i mod pi) mod π
where Mi =
π
pi
.
The distributions of single bit with single private key is
Dγ,ρ(p) := {choose q ← Z ∩ [0,
2γ
p
), e← Z ∩ (−2ρ, 2ρ) : output x = pq + e}
The distributions of `Q−bits with multi-private keys is
Dρ(p1, . . . , pk;Q1, . . . , Qk; q0) := {choose e0 ← Z ∩ [0, q0), ei ← Z ∩ (−2ρ, 2ρ)
output x = CRT(q0,p1,...,pk)(e0, e1Q1, . . . , ekQk), for ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , k}}
Consider the value of x when k = 1, since D := {choose q ← Z ∩ [0, q0), e ←
Z ∩ (−2ρ, 2ρ) : output x = p1q + e mod p1q0}, there is x← Dρ(p1; q0).
x = CRT(q0;p1)(e0, e1)
= e0p1(p
−1
1 mod q0) + e1q0(q
−1
0 mod p1) mod q0p1
= e0p1α + e1(p1β + 1) mod q0p1
= (e0α + e1β)p1 + e1 mod q0p1
for some α and β. Since e0 6≡ modq0 and gcd(α, q0) = 1, (e0α + e1β) mod q0 is
uniformly in Z ∩ [0, q0).
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2.5.4.6 Public Key Compression
The implementation of the DGHV fully homomorphic encryption scheme has a large
size of public key in Õ(λ10). To resist lattice attack, each public key needs at least 223
bits, the size of public key will be 246 bits, it is too large for practical system. Coron
[16] presented an efficient way to compress public key of the DGHV scheme, by using
quadratic form instead of linear form when computing a ciphertext:
• KeyGen(λ):
Pick a random prime p ∈ [2η−1, 2η). Let x0 = q0 · p where q0 is a random square
free 2λ−rough integer in [0, 2γ/p). Generate integers xi,b ← p · qi,b + ri,b, where
1 ≤ i ≤ β, b ∈ {0, 1}, qi,b is random integer in [0, q0) and ri,b is random integer
in (−2ρ, 2ρ). Output sk = p and pk =< x0, x1,0, x1,1, . . . , xβ,0, xβ,1 >.
• Encrypt(pk,m):
Input a random vector b = (bi,j) ∈ [0, 2α), of size τ = β2. Generate a random
integer r ∈ (−2ρ, 2ρ). Output a ciphertext c← m+ 2r+ 2
∑
1≤i,j≤β bi,j ·x1,0 ·xj,1
• Decryp and Evaluate:
It is the same as the original scheme but with modulus x0 after addition and
multiplication.
The scheme can extend into higher degree [17]. Use the same way to generate elements
and encrypt the plaintext as follow:
c∗ = m+ 2r + 2
∑
1≤i,j≤β
bij . . . xi,0 . . . xj,1 mod x0
The authors proved the scheme is semantically secure under the error-free approximate
GCD assumption. They applied the leftover hash lemma on hash function family
h′ : [0, 2α)β
2 → Zq0 , where h′(b) =
∑
1≤i,j≤β bi,j · qi,0 · qj,1 mod q0.
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Definition 2.5.7. (Hash Function) [16] A family H of hash function h : X → Y is
ε−pairwise independent if
∑
x 6=x′
(Prh←H[h(x)) = h
′(x)]− 1
Y
) ≤ |X|2 · ε
|Y |
Lemma 2.5.1. (Leftover Hash Lemma) [16] LetH be a family of ε−pairwise inde-
pendent hash functions. Suppose that h ← H and x ← X are chosen uniformly and
independently. Then (h, h(X)) is (1
2
√
|Y |/|X|+ ε)−uniformly over H× Y
The key elementxi,b have been proved that a certain family of quadratic hash
function is close enough to be pairwise independent, so this can apply the leftover
hash lemma. The significance of this method is reducing the size of public key from
τ = Õ(λ3) down to 2β = Õ(λ1.5).
The semantic security of the scheme based on approximate-GCD assumption with
error-free x0. The adversary can find the exact multiple p by solving the AGCD
problem. The known attack had been presented on van Dijk’ paper [20]
Definition 2.5.8. (AGCD Problem) [50] Let ci ∈ Z, τ integers such that there exist
some unique integers ri ∈ Z and a unique integer p ∈ N such that ∀i, (ci− ri)|p and ∀i
, |ri| ≤ γ ≤ p/2. Then, the Approximate Greatest Common Divisor problem, denoted
by γ − AGCDτ , is to find p, given ci.
2.5.5 Fully Homomorphic Encryption Schemes
Many SHE and FHE schemes have been proposed after Gentry’s work. These schemes
can be classified based on different hardness assumptions as in figure [11].
• The first category is based on hard problems on lattices that starts with Gentry’s
work[Gen09a,Gen09b] [25], [26], [62], [27], [63], [27].
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• The second category relies on the approximate greatest common divisor (AGCD)
problem and some variants. The typical scheme is [vDGHV10] [15], [20].
• The third category is based on the learning with errors (LWE) and on the ring-
learning with errors (RLWE) problems like schemes [NLV11, BGV12, GHS12b,
Bra12, GSW13] [4], [5], [7], [6], [31].
Figure 2.1: Hardness assumptions and schemes
2.5.5.1 Gentry’s First Fully Homomorphic Encryption Scheme [25]
Gentry used the ideal lattices to construct fully homomorphic encryption scheme of
PKE [26]. A ciphertext ψ is in form of v + x when v is in the ideal lattices and x
is in the error distribution. The coefficient of ciphertext vectors is the elements in a
polynomial ring Z[x]/f(x). The addition and multiplication of ciphertext satisfy the
ring operation. The security of the scheme is based on a natural decisional version of
the closest vector problem for ideal lattices for ideals in a ring.
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Gentry’s initial somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme is based on lattice.
• KeyGenE(R,BI):
Input a ring R and a basis BI of lattice I. It sets (B
sk
J ,B
sk
J )← IdealGen(R,BI).
The public key has R,BI,B
pk
J and Samp, where Samp is an algorithm whith
sampling basis from the coset of lattice.
The secret key is BskJ .
• EncryptE(pk,m):
Input a public key pk and a plaintext m ∈ P . It sets ψ′ ← Samp(m,BI , R,BpkJ )
Output a ciphertext ψ′ ← ψ mod BpkJ .
• DecryptE(sk, ψ):
Input the secret key and a ciphertext ψ.
Output m← (ψ mod BskJ ) mod BI
• EvaluateE(pk, C,Ψ):
Input the public key pk and a circuit C composed of AddBI and MultBI , and
a set of ciphertext ψ .
Output new ciphertext ψ.
Add(pk, ψ1, ψ2). Output ψ1 + ψ2 mod B
pk
J .
Mult(pk, ψ1, ψ2). Output ψ1 × ψ2 mod BpkJ .
This somewhat homomorphic scheme is not yet bootstrappable. The way to squash
the decryption procedure is reducing the degree of the decryption polynomial. Gentry
added the public key in form of sparse subset-sum problem (SSSP). The public key
is augmented with a big set of vectors, so there is a very sparse subset of public key
that adds up to the secret key [27]. A ciphertext of the underlying scheme can be
decrypted with a low-degree polynomial. The scheme with bootstrapping is the fully
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homomorphic scheme E (d) with security parameter λ which can handle all circuit of
depth d is given:
• KeyGenE(d)(λ, d):
(ski, pki)← KeyGenE(λ) for i ∈ [0, d]
¯skij ← EncyptE(pki−1, skij) for i ∈ [1, d], j ∈ [1, `]
sk(d) ← sk0, pk(d) ← (< pki >,< ¯skij >)
• EncryptE(d)(pkd,m):
Input a public key pk(d) and a plaintext m ∈ P ,
Output a ciphertext ψ ← EncryptE(pkd,m).
• DecryptE(d)(sk(d), ψ):
Input a secret key sk(d) and a ciphertext ψ.
Output DecryptE(sk0, ψ).
• EvaluateE(δ)(pk(δ), C(δ),Ψ(δ)):
Input the public key pk(δ), a circuit C(δ) of depth at most δ, and a tuple of
ciphertext Ψ(δ).
Output new tuple of ciphertext Ψ(δ−1) until δ = 0 and terminates.
Set (C†δ−1,Ψ
†
δ−1)← AugmentE(δ)(pk(δ), C(δ),Ψ(δ)).
Set (Cδ−1,Ψδ−1)← ReduceE(δ−1)(pk(δ−1), C
†
(δ−1),Ψ
†
(δ−1)).
Runs EvaluateE(δ−1)(pk
(δ−1), C(δ−1),Ψ(δ−1)).
Unfortunately, Gentry’s scheme has the inherent efficiency limitations. In the decryp-
tion circuit, each secret-key bit is replaced by a large ciphertext that encrypts that
bit. The complexity of the scheme is extremly large, which will be defined as the
bit-length of the individual ciphertexts that are used to encrypt the bits of the secret
key times the complexity of the decryption[28]. The bottleneck in practical is the time
of per-gate evaluation.
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2.5.5.2 Dijk, Gentry, Halevi and Vaikuntanathan’s Scheme Over The In-
tegers (DGHV)[20]
Dijk, Gentry, Halevi and Vaikuntanathan published a fully homomorphic encryption
scheme over the integer rather than on ideal lattice [20].The construction of the some-
what fully homomorphic scheme:
• KeyGen(λ): Secret Key: choose random odd η- bits integer p: p ← (2Z + 1) ∩
[2η∩, 2η).
Public Key: sample uniformly xi ← Dγ, ρ(p), for i = 1, 2, . . . , τ . The odd integer
x0 has to be the largest number and the remainder of x0 mod p is even.
Output sk = p and pk =< x1, x2, . . . , xτ >.
• Encrypt(pk,m): Input a random subset S ⊂ 1, . . . , τ , a random integer r in
(−2ρ′ , 2ρ) and a plaintext m ∈ 0, 1
Output a ciphertext c← [m+ 2r + 2
∑
i∈S xi]x0 .
• Decrypt(sk,c): Input a secret key sk and a ciphertext c.
Output m← (c mod p) mod 2.
• Evaluate(pk, C, c1, . . . , cτ ): Input t ciphertext ci as t inputs to the binary circuit
CE , apply addition and multiplication gates of CE on ciphertext.
Output the integer of operation result.
The noise expands quickly especially under multiplication. Assuming the bound of
noise in the fresh ciphertext x0 is B, let the degree of decryption polynomial f is
d. The scheme can decrypt the ciphertext correctly when |f | < p/2. Due to the
condition, the bound of noise has td · Bd < p/2 after d times multiplication, in other
words d < (log p)/(log tB). The depth of decryption circuit depends on the operation
levels on c · p−1 witch is at least 2(log p)2.71 levels. It is obviously bigger than the
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polynomial degree d. To get fully homomorphic encryption, the bootstrapping with
squashing the decryption circuit is still essential [30].
The security of the DGHV scheme is based on two problems, one is the hardness of
approximate-gcd problem in somewhat homomorphic encryption and another is SSSP
in bootstrapping. To against the known attack on the approximate-gcd problem like
brute-forcing the remainders, continued fraction and Howgrave-Graham’s approximate
gcd algorithm, the security parameter of the scheme needs at least 2λ [10], [35].
2.5.5.3 Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan’s Scheme Based on RLWE (BV11b)
[6]
Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan presented a scheme based on RLWE [6]. They used two
technique: re-linearization and dimension-modulus reduction to construct the scheme.
Re-linearization can reduct the size of the ciphertext back down to n+ 1. Let s be the
original secret key and t is the new secret key. Each ciphertext is (αi,j, bi,j) where
bi,j =< αi,j, t > +2ei,j + s[i] · · · [j] ≈< αi,j, t > +s[i] · [j].
Consider the multiplication of two polynomials,
fα,b(x) · fα′,b(x) = (b−
∑
α[i]x[i]) · (b′ −
∑
α′[i]x[i])
= h0 +
∑
hi · x[i] +
∑
hi,j · x[i]x[j]
= h0 +
∑
hi(bi− < αi, t >) +
∑
i,j
hi,j · (bi,j− < αi,j, t >)
the result is the linear polynomial with n+1 coefficients and can be decrypt by the new
secret key t. It is a good way to multiplicative two ciphertext without expanding the
size and can be decrypted under the new secret key. The somewhat fully homomorphic
encryption scheme is given as:
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• KeyGen(λ):
Choose randomL+ 1 vectors s0, s1, . . . , sL ← Znq
Choose random matrix A← Zm×nq
Choose a random vector e← χm
Compute b = As0 + 2e
Output sk = sL and pk = (A, b).
• Encrypt(pk,m):
Choose a random vector r ← {0, 1}m
Set v = AT r ∈ Znq
Set w = bT r +m ∈ Zq
Output a ciphertext c← ((v, w), `).
• Decrypt(sk,c):
Input a secret key sk and a ciphertext c.
Output m← (w− < v, sL > mod p) mod 2.
• Evaluate(pk, f, c1, . . . , cτ ):
Addition gates: cAdd = ((vAdd, wAdd, `) := ((
∑
i vi,
∑
iwi), `)
Multiplication gates: cMult = ((vMult, wMult), `)
The security of the scheme relies on the worst-case hardness of standard problem on
lattices [44].
2.5.5.4 Brakerski, Gentry and Vaikuntanathan’ Scheme Based on LWE
(BGV12) [5]
BGV is the most efficiency scheme so far. The scheme applies key switching and
modulus switching, it is a leveled fully homomorphic encryption scheme without boot-
strapping. It reduces the production of two ciphertext down to the original dimension
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by key switching and reduces the noise by modulus switching on each level[5]. The
scheme can be based on the LWE and also the RLWE. The scheme on the RLWE has
a better efficiency than on the LWE. Let ring R = Z[x]/(xd + 1), where d is the power
of 2 and N = d(2n+ 1) log qe. The schemes is:
• KeyGen(λ):
Choose random s′ ← χn
Let s = (1, s) with s[0] = 1 and s′ ∈ Rnq Choose random matrix A← RN×nq
Choose a random vector e← χN
Compute b = A′s′ + 2e
Set A is the (n+1) column matrix (b| − A′)
Output sk = (1, s′[1], . . . , s′[n]) ∈ Rn+1q and pk = A.
• Encrypt(pk,m):
Let m← (m, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ Rn+1q
Choose a random vector r ← RN2
Output a ciphertext c← m+ AT r ∈ Rn+1q .
• Decrypt(sk,c):
Input a secret key sk and a ciphertext c.
Output m← (< v, sL > mod p) mod 2.
• Evaluate(pk, f, c1, . . . , cτ ):
Addition gates: c4 = Refresh(c3, τ
′′
sj
→ sj−1, qj, qj−1), where c3 ← c1 + c2
mod qj
Multiplication gates: c4 = Refresh(c3, τ
′′
sj
→ sj−1, qj, qj−1), where c3 is the linear
equation of Llongc1,c2(x
⊗
x)
Assuming the error with bound B and the corresponding modulus is qj. The noise will
increase to 2B by addition and approximated to be B2 by multiplication. After the key
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switching, the error becomes to be E2 +eswitch. Processing the modulus switching, the
error decrease to (qj−1/qj) · (E2 + eswitch) + escale. To decrypt the ciphertext correctly,
the error should be smaller than B on each level [3]. The scheme can operate on
the circuit of the depth L. It can transfer to the fully homomorphic encryption by
bootstrapping. The security of the scheme relies on the SVP problem on lattices [41].
2.5.5.5 Brakerski’s Scheme Based on LWE (Bra12) [4]
The scheme is also based on the LWE problem which can be extend on the RLWE.
The advantages of Bra scheme are: using the same modulus which means the scheme
does not need to do the modulus switching. The security can be classical reducing
from the worst-case hardness of the GapSVP problem [4].
The technique they used to construct the scheme is vector decomposition and key
switching. Vector decomposition is a way to operate the inner product.
• BitDecompq(x):
For x ∈ Zn, let wi ∈ {0, 1}n, x can represent as x =
∑dlog qe−1
i=0 2
i · wi mod q.
• PowerOfTwoq(y):
For y ∈ Zn, output [(y, 2 · y, . . . , 2dlog qe−1 · y)]q ∈ Zn·dlog qe−1q
The somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme is:
• KeyGen(λ):
Choose randomL+ 1 vectors s0, s1, . . . , sL ← Znq
Choose random matrix A← ZN×nq
Choose a random vector e← χm
Compute b0 = As0 + 2e
Set P0 is the (n+ 1) column matrix (b0| − A′)
s̃i−1 = BitDecomp(1, si−1)
⊗
PowerOfTwo(1, si−1) ∈ {0, 1}((n+1)dlog qe)
2
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Compute Pi−1 : i← SwitchKeyGen(s̃i−1, si)
Output sk = sL and pk = P0, and evk = {P(i−1):i}i∈[L].
• Encrypt(pk,m):
Let m← (m, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ Rn+1q
Choose a random vector r ← RN2
Output a ciphertext c← m+ AT r ∈ Rn+1q
• Decrypt(sk,c):
Input a secret key sk and a ciphertext c.
Output m←< v, s > mod p) mod 2.
• Evaluate(pk, f, c1, . . . , cτ ):
Addition gates: cAdd = SwitchKey(P(i−1):i, c̃Add) ∈ Z :n+1q , where c̃Add =
PowerOfTwo(c1 + c2)
⊗
PowerOfTwo(1, 0, . . . , 0)
Multiplication gates: cMult = SwitchKey(P(i−1):i, c̃Mult) ∈ Z :n+1q , where c̃Mult
= b2
q
·PowerOfTwo(c1)
⊗
PowerOfTwo(c2))e
The noise increasing in this scheme is different as previously schemes. Assuming the
noise bound of the ciphertext is E and the fresh ciphertext has noise bound of N ·B.
The noise increases to 2E+n2 log q3 after addition and (n · log q) ·E+(n2 logq3) ·B after
multiplication. Since multiplication is defined as (2/q) · (c1
⊗
c2), each item divided
by q, E2/q can be ignored when q is large enough for classical reduction from GapSVP
[4]. To get the decryption correctly, the error needs to be less than bq/2c/2, therefore
q/B > (n · log q)L. The depth L depends on the ratio of q/B.
2.5.5.6 Plantard, Susilo and Zhang’ s Hidden Ideal Lattice [50]
Plantard, Susilo and Zhang constructed a fully homomorphic encryption scheme by
using hidden ideal lattice [50]. They used hidden ideal lattice to unify two schemes
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which are ideal lattice based schemes and integer based schemes. The security of the
scheme does not relies on the sparse sub set sum problem (SSSP), but relies on the
bounded distance decoding problem(BDDH)of ideal lattice and approximate greatest
common divisor problem (AGCD) of integer.
Definition 2.5.9. (BDDP over Ideal Lattice) [50] Let γ ∈ R+ be a positive real. Let
L be an n dimensional ideal lattice, and v ∈ Z such that there exists a unique vector
u ∈ L satisfying dist(v, u) ≤ γ. The γ-Bounded Distance Decoding problem over ideal
lattice, denoted by γ-BDDn, is to find u, given a basis of L and v.
Definition 2.5.10. (Dec BDDP over Ideal Lattice) [50] Let γ ∈ R+ be a positive
real. Let L be an n dimensional ideal lattice, and v ∈ Z. The decisional γ-Bounded
Distance Decoding problem over ideal lattice, denoted by Dec γ-BDDin, is to decide
if there exists a unique vector u ∈ L satisfying dist(v, u) ≤ γ. or not, given a basis of
Land v.
Definition 2.5.11. (AGCD Problem) [50] Let ci ∈ Z, τ integers such that there exist
some unique integers ri ∈ Z and a unique integer p ∈ N such that ∀i, (ci− ri)|p and ∀i
, |ri| ≤ γ ≤ p/2. Then, the Approximate Greatest Common Divisor problem, denoted
by γ − AGCDτ , is to find p, given ci.
Definition 2.5.12. (Subset Sum Problem) [50] Let {c1, c2, . . . , cn} be a set of positive
integers. Let c =
∑n
i=1 sici, where si ∈ {0, 1} . Let d ←
∑n
i=1 si. The subset sum
problem, denoted by d, n-SSP, is to find {si}, given {ci} and c.
The hidden ideal lattice homomorphic encryption scheme gives an idea, that instead
of giving the lattice as public key, given some vectors close to the lattice. The lattice
is only known by secret key holder. Since the ciphertext are also vectors close to the
lattice with a bounded distance, the property of the homomorphism of the ciphertext
still holds [38]. The somewhat scheme is :
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• KeyGen(λ):
Choose a random irreducible polynomial of degree n, f(x) = xn + 1.
Choose a random vector v in {u ∈ Zn, 2η−1 <‖u‖ < 2η,
∑n−1
i=0 ui mod 2 = 1}.
Generate the random matrix V ← Rot(v, f):
Rot(v, f) =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
v0 v1 v2 . . . vn−1
−vn−1 v0 v1 . . . vn−2
...
...
...
. . .
...
−v1 −v2 −v3 . . . v0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Let d← |det(V)| is the determinant of V .
Choose random τ−1 vectors gi in {u ∈ Zn, 2γ−1 <‖u‖ < 2γ}, and another vector
gτ in {u ∈ Zn, ‖u‖ < 2γ,
∑n−1
i=0 ui mod 2 = 1}.
Choose random τ−1 vectors ri in {u ∈ {−1, 0, 1}n, ‖u‖ ≤ ρ}, and another vector
rτ in {u ∈ {−1, 0, 1}n, ‖u‖ ≤ ρ,
∑n−1
i=0 ui mod 2 = 1}.
Compute τ vectors πi ← gi × v + ri, for 1 ≤ i ≤ τ.
Find the integer polynomial w(x), which satisfies w(x) × v(x) = d mod f(x),
denoteW ← Rot(w, f). Output sk = s{d, w} and pk = {πi}.
• Encrypt(pk,m):
Choose random τ−1 vector si in {
∑n
j=1 si,j mod 2 = 0, 1 ≤ i ≤ τ−1}, a vector
sτ in {
∑n
j=1 sτ,i mod 2 = m}, and a vector sτ+1 in {
∑n
j=1 sτ+1,j mod 2 = 0}.
Output a ciphertext c←
∑n
i=1 si × πi + sτ+1.
• Decrypt(sk,c):
c′ ← bc× w/de. Output c← c′(1) mod 2.
• Evaluate(pk, C, . . . , cτ ):
Addition gates (c1, c2): Output c← c1 + c2.
Multiplication gates (c1, c2): Output c← c1 × c2.
The semantic security of the scheme has been proved:
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Theorem 2.5.2. [33] If an algorithm A breaks the semantic security with advantage ε,
then there exist an algorithm B that solves the Dec α, β −BDDHin,τ with advantage
of ε/8. The running time of B is polynomial in the running time of A.
2.5.5.7 Nuida and Kurosawa’s Batching Scheme [12]
The majority Fully homomorphic encryption schemes and somewhat homomorphic
schemes can only encrypt single bit each time. The efficiency can be improved by
using batch plaintext into a single bit [12]. The scheme can encrypt multiple bits into
a single ciphertext by using Chinese Remainder Theorem. But it is only applied in
binary space. Kofi et. modified the scheme into the non-binary space.
In DGHV scheme, the public key size in somewhat homomorphic encryption s
Õ(λ10) and in fully homomorphic encryption is Õ(λ13). Coron describes public key
compression for fully homomorphic encryption over integers. It reduces the public
key size to Õ(λ5) of somewhat homomorphic encryption and Õ(λ8) of fully homo-
morphic encryption. Consider the batch fully homomorphic encryption scheme in
non-binary space, the public key size is Õ(λ8) in both somewhat homomorphic en-
cryption and fully homomorphic encryption. To achieve this goal, CRT (Chinese Re-
mainder Theory) is an important technique [36]. Let p1, . . . , p2 are pairwise coprime
integers and CRT(p1,...,p2)(m1, . . . ,mk) is a number in Z ∩ (−π2 ,
π
2
], where π =
∏k
i=1 pi.
CRT(p1,...,pk)(m1, . . . ,mk) is equivalent to mi mod pi for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k} . So we have
CRT(p1,...,p2)(m1, . . . ,mk) =
k∑
i=1
miMi(M
−1
i mod pi) mod π
where Mi = π/pi. The distributions of `Q−bits with multi-private keys is
Dρ(p1, . . . , pk;Q1, . . . , Qk; q0) := {choose e0 ← Z ∩ [0, q0), ei ← Z ∩ (−2ρ, 2ρ)}.
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Output
x = CRT(q0,p1,...,pk)(e0, e1Q1, . . . , ekQk), for ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , k}.
Consider the value of x when k = 1, since D := {choose q ← Z ∩ [0, q0), e ←
Z ∩ (−2ρ, 2ρ) : output x = p1q + e mod p1q0}, there is x← Dρ(p1; q0).
x = CRT(q0;p1)(e0, e1)
= e0p1(p
−1
1 mod q0) + e1q0(q
−1
0 mod p1) mod q0p1
= (e0α + e1β)p1 + e1 mod q0p1
for some α and β. Since e0 6≡ modq0 and gcd(α, q0) = 1, (e0α + e1β) mod q0 is
uniformly in Z ∩ [0, q0). Recall Nuida and Kurosawa’s batch somewhat homomorphic
encryption scheme. The plaintext space isM = (ZQ1)h1×(ZQ2)h2×· · ·×(ZQk)hk , where
k > 1, hj > 1 and Q1, . . . , Qk are distinct primes. The scheme to pack ` plaintext
bits m0, . . . ,m`?1 into a single ciphertext is the extension of the DGHV scheme which
listed as following [12]:
• KeyGen (1λ):
Pick random prime numbers pi,j as secret key, (i, j) ∈ I and I := {(i, j)|i, j ∈
Z, 1 ≤ i ≤ k, 1 ≤ j ≤ hi}. p(i,j) and Qi′are different. Choose
q0 ← [1, 2γ/
∏
(i,j)∈I
pi,j) ∩ROUGH(2λ
2
),
which is coprime to all pi,j and all Qi′ . Choose eξ;0 and eξ;i,j for ξ ∈ {1, 2, . . . , τ}
and (i, j) ∈ I:
eξ;0 ← [0, q0) ∩ Z, eξ;i,j ← (−2ρ, 2ρ) ∩ Z.
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Let xξ be the unique integer in (−N/2, N/2] satisfying
xξ ≡ eξ;0 (mod q0), xξ ≡ eξ;i,jQi (mod pi,j) for (i, j) ∈ I
Similarly, for (i, j), (i′, j′) ∈ I, choose e′i,j;0 and ei,j;i′,j′ :
e′i,j;0 ← [0, q0) ∩ Z, ei,j;i′j′ ← (−2ρ, 2ρ) ∩ Z,
and let x′i,jbe the unique integer in (−N/2, N/2] satisfying:
x′i,j ≡ e′i,j;0 (mod q0)
x′i,j ≡ e′i,j;i′,j′Qi′ + δ(i,j),(i′,j′) (mod pi′,j′),
where δ is Kronecker delta. The public key pk consists of all N , xξ and x
′
i,j, and
the secret key sk consists all pi,j.
• Encrypt (pk,m ∈M):
Generate a random subset T ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , τ}. Output the ciphertext as
c :=
∑
(i,j)I
mi,jx
′
i,j +
∑
ξ∈T
ModN, c ∈ (−N/2, N/2] ∩ Z.
• Evaluate (pk, f , c1, . . . , cn):
Given a polynomial f with integer coefficients and ciphertext c1, . . . , cn, output
c∗ is
c∗ := f(c1, . . . , cn) ModN
• Decrypt (sk, c):
Output m := ((cMod pi,j) mod Qi)(i,j) ∈ I.
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The scheme is secured under the Error- Free Approximate-GCD assumption.
Definition 2.5.13. (Error-Free Approximate GCD problem) [50] For a random η−bit
prime p, y0 = q0 . . . p where q0 is a random integer in [0, 2
γ/ρ), and polynomially many
samples from Dρ(p, q0), then output p.
Similarly, for batching scheme, the specific integers are q0 and pi,j(i, j) ∈ I. We
input a vector m ∈ Z` into the oracle Oq0,(pi,j)(i, j) ∈ I and the output will be X,
X = CRTq0,(pi,j)(q0,m1,1 +Q1 · r1,1, . . . ,mk,hi +Qk · rk,hi)
where q ← [0, q0) and ri,j ← (−2ρ, 2ρ) Since it is hard to distinguish between an
encryption of zero and an encryption of a random message by using the public-key
encryption instead of the oracle. The scheme can be proved to be semantically secure
[33].
Chapter 3
The construction of Fully
Homomorphic Encryption Scheme
3.1 Our Scheme with Compression Public Key
Our technique consists in working on vectors with integer coefficient V ec(πi,j) of the
form V ec(πi,j) = V ec(πi) × V ec(πj). The number of the public key stored is 2β not
τ as initial. The τ public keys in the encryption can be generated by τ = β2 public
keys. Then our encryption is no longer choosing a linear form as the public key. We
will use a quadratic form.
3.1.1 SHE Scheme
The somewhat homomorphic scheme with public key compression on hidden ideal
lattice is constructed as follows. Generate random polynomial vectors as the ring
element, divide into two groups. Choose a vector from each group, then multiply the
two vector modular the irreducible polynomial. Therefore, the original public key will
be replaced by the new quadratic key.
40
3.1. Our Scheme with Compression Public Key 41
• KeyGen(λ):
Choose a random irreducible polynomial of degree n, f(x) = xn + 1.
Choose a random vector v in {u ∈ Zn, 2η−1 <‖u‖ < 2η,
∑n−1
i=0 ui mod 2 = 1}.
Generate the random matrix V ← Rot(v, f):
Rot(v, f) =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
v0 v1 v2 . . . vn−1
−vn−1 v0 v1 . . . vn−2
...
...
...
. . .
...
−v1 −v2 −v3 . . . v0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Let d ← |det(V)| is the determinant of V . It is almost the same as the initial
scheme so far, the difference is starting from the public key vector generation
Choose two groups of random vectors, each group has β vectors gi or gj for
1 ≤ i, j ≤ β, the Euclidean norm of each vector is in {u ∈ Zn, 2γ−1 <‖u‖ < 2γ}.
There is at least one vector of each group with the Euclidean norm in {u ∈
Zn, ‖u‖ < 2γ,
∑n−1
i=0 ui mod 2 = 1}. The total number of vectors is 2β which
equals 2
√
τ .
Choose two groups of random vectors, each group has β vectors ri or rj for
1 ≤ i, j ≤ β, the Euclidean norm of each vector is in {u ∈ Rn, ‖u‖ ≤ ρ}. There
is at least one vector of each group with the Euclidean norm in {u ∈ Rn, ‖u‖ ≤
ρ,
∑n−1
i=0 ui mod 2 = 1}. The total number of vectors is 2β which equals 2
√
τ .
Compute β vectors πi ← gi×v+ri and β vectors πj ← gj×v+rj , for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ β.
Find the integer polynomial w(x), which satisfies w(x) × v(x) = d mod f(x),
denote W ← Rot(w, f).
Output sk = {d, w} and pk = {πi and πj}.
• Encryption:
Choose random τ − 1 vector si,j in {
∑n
t=1 si,j,t mod 2 = 0, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ β − 1}, a
vector sτ in {
∑n
t=1 sτ,t mod 2 = m} and a vector sτ+1 in {
∑n
t=1 sτ+1,t mod 2 =
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0}. The Euclidean norm of all s are ‖s‖ ≤ ζ.
Output a ciphertext c←
∑β
i,j=1 si,j × πi × πj + sτ+1.
• Evaluation and Decryption:
The decryption and evaluation are the same as the initial scheme.
3.1.2 Correctness of Somewhat Homomorphic Encryption
First, we recall the definition of rEnc and rDec in Gentry’s idea [26].
Definition 3.1.1. (rEnc and rDec) [50] r represents the distance between a ciphertext
ψ and the hidden ideal lattice L. rEnc is the maximum possible distance for the
encryption algorithm, and rDec is the minimum possible distance for the decryption
algorithm.
We define the rpk as the maximum distance between a public key πi,b and the hidden
ideal lattice. According to the KeyGen algorithm, we have rpk ≥ θ · ρ2. The noise of
a ciphertext is the production of s and ri,b with the quadratic form in the encryption.
The distance between a ciphertext and the hidden ideal lattice is rEnc ≤ θ · (θ ·ρ2) ·ζ =
θ2 · ρ2 · ζ. Since θ =
√
n is a constant of polynomial, we have rEnc ≤ n · ρ2 · ζ. From
the result in [29], it shows rDec ∼ 2η. To decrypt the ciphertext correctly, we assume
rEnc < rDec which means n · ρ2 · ζ ≤ 2η.
We will first prove the correctness of the decryption algorithm. For any ciphertext
ψ, we consider the ciphertext has two parts, ψ = a+ b, where a ∈ Zn and b ∈ L. Since
a =
∑β
i,j=1 ri × rj × si,j + sτ+1, we have‖a‖ ≤ nρ2ζ. Because b ∈ L, we realize the
only factor impacts on the decryption is a, hence a = ψ mod V = ψ − bψ · V −1e · V .
V −1 = W/d and the norm of the lattice L d is odd. Since d and 2 is co-prime, so
we have a mod 2 = dψ ·W/dc mod 2 = dψ · w/dc mod 2 = ψ′ mod 2. Therefore
ψ′ mod 2 = a mod 2 =
∑β
i,j=1 ri × rj × si,j + sτ+1 mod 2. Next consider ψ′(1)
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mod 2 =
∑β
i,j=1 ri(1)× rj(1)× si,j(1) + sτ+1(1) mod 2, since random vectors si,j are
in {
∑n
t=1 si,j,t mod 2 = 0, 1 ≤ i ≤ τ − 1} and {
∑n
t=1 sτ+1,t mod 2 = 0}, we have
ψ′(1) mod 2 = rβ,β(1)sβ,β(1) mod 2 = m mod 2. The correctness of decryption has
been proved .
Next, we prove the correctness of evaluation algorithm. Suppose ψ1 = a1 + b1,
and ψ2 = a2 + b2 where a1, a2 ∈ Zn, b1, b2 ∈ L, ‖a1‖, ‖a2‖ ≤ nρ2ζ, and at(x) =∑τ2
i=1 rt,i(x)st,i(x) + sj,β2+1(x) mod f(x). Consider the Add algorithm first, ψ(x) ←
ψ1(x)+ψ2(x) mod f(x) = (a1(x)+a2(x))+(b1(x)+ b2(x)) mod f(x). Since (b1(x)+
b2(x)) ∈ L, we have ‖V ec(a1(x) + a2(x))‖ ≤ rDec, decryption will be a1(1) + a2(1) =
m1 +m2. The add algorithm is correct.
Similarly for Multiplication algorithm, ψ(x)← ψ1(x)× ψ2(x) mod f(x) = (a1(x)
a2(x))+(a1(x)b2(x))+(a2(x)b1(x))+(b1(x)b2(x)) mod f(x). Since (b1(x)b2(x)), (a1(x)
b2(x)) and (a2(x)b1(x)) ∈ L, we have ‖V ec(a1(x) · a2(x))‖ ≤ rDec, decryption will be
a1(1)× a2(1) = m1 ×m2. Multiplication algorithm is correct.
3.2 The Security
In this section, we will prove our new scheme is semantically secure under the adap-
tation of the approximate greatest common factor (AGCD) assumption. The ad-
versary can break the semantic security by instead of finding the vector V . The
hash function family h(b) =
∑τ
i=1 bi · πi in the linear form is pairwise independent.
By applying the leftover hash lemma, we want to prove that hash function family
h
′
(b) =
∑β
i,j=1 bi,j · πi · πj in the quadratic form is almost pairwise independent, which
is ε−pairwise independent.
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3.2.1 Leftover Hash Lemma
For a pairwise independent hash function family H, the hash function h : X → Y
holds Prh[h(x) = h(x
′
)] = 1/|Y | for all x 6= x′ . For our variant, the hash function
family is h
′
: Z(n×β)×(n×β) → Zn, where h′(b) =
∑β
i,j=1 bi,j · πi · πj. It is not an exactly
pairwise independent, but it could be almost pairwise independent with parameter.
The following definition gives the ε−pairwise independent:
Definition 3.2.1. [16](ε−pairwise independent) A family H of hash function h : X →
Y is ε−pairwise independent if
∑
x 6=x′
(Prh←H[h(x)) = h
′(x)]− 1
Y
) ≤ |X|2 · ε
|Y |
The leftover hash lemma give by the prior definition.
Lemma 3.2.1. (Leftover Hash Lemma) [16] Let H be a family of ε−pairwise inde-
pendent hash functions. Suppose that h ← H and x ← X are chosen uniformly and
independently. Then (h, h(X)) is (1
2
√
|Y |/|X|+ ε)−uniformly over H× Y
Lemma 3.2.2. For an odd determinant d, the hash function family H is ε- pairwise
independence, with
ε =
1
d
+
n2τ
2n2τ−2nβ
3.2.2 Semantic Security
The semantic security of the scheme has been proved:
Lemma 3.2.3. If an algorithm A breaks the semantic security with advantage ε, then
there exist an algorithm B that solves the Dec α, β − BDDHin,τ with advantage of
3ε/32. The running time of B is polynomial in the running time of A.
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3.3 FHE Scheme
In this section, we follow the Gentry’s idea, use the bootstrapping technique to achieve
fully homomorphic encryption scheme. Our scheme is similar as the initial scheme,
the slightly difference is we using pseudo-random vector generator to construct the
public key set. First, we will squash the decryption algorithm into a lower degree of
the decryption polynomial. Then, we describe the bootstrappable scheme, which the
post-processed ciphertext can be decrypted by modified decryption polynomial more
efficiently.
3.3.1 The squashed Scheme
First, introduce four more parameters κ, σ, Θ and φ with functions of λ. More
precisely, κ = η + γ + 1 + φ, σ = λ, Θ = Õ(λ3) and φ = dlog2(σ + 1)e. We will
add a set of public key y = {y1, . . . , yΘ} of rational numbers in [0, 2) of κ bits. There
is a sparse subset S ⊂ {1, . . . ,Θ} of size σ with
∑
i∈S yi ' wi/d. The ciphertext is
expanded by computing with yi. The secret key sk is replaced by the binary vector of
the subset S.
Instead of storing the whole set of yi in the public key, we will use the pseudo-
random vector generator f(se) with seed se to generate yi for 2 ≤ i ≤ Θ. Then the
public key consists of se and y1. The scheme will be as follows:
• KeyGen(λ):
Generated sk∗ = w1, d and pk
∗ for the somewhat scheme. Set xi =< x1, . . . , xn >
with xi ← d2κ × wi/dc
Choose n vectors si =< si,1, . . . , si,Θ > with Θ-dimensional, each si has hamming
weight σ. Specifically, let si,1 = 1 and S = {i, j : si,j = 1}
Set ui,1 such that
∑
i,j∈S ui,j = xi. Use f(se) to generate vectors of Θ-dimensional
ui =< ui,1, . . . , ui,Θ > with ui,j ∈ [0, 2κ+1), for 2 ≤ i ≤ Θ.
3.3. FHE Scheme 46
Set yi,j = ui,j/2
γ and yi = {yi,1, . . . , yi,Θ}, with γ bits after binary point.
[
∑Θ
j=1 yi,j]2 = (wi/d)−∆d for some |∆d| < 2−κ.
Output sk = {si} and pk = {πi,j, se, yi,1}, for i ∈ n.
• Encryption and Evaluation: Given a ciphertext ψ =< ψ1, . . . , ψn >, for each
coefficient with respect to ψi with i ∈ n, generate zj = ψj ·yj, for j ∈ {1, . . . ,Θ},
and keep φ = dlog2(σ + 1)e bits after binary point for each zj.
Output ψ and zj
• Decryption:
ψ∗i = [zi · si] and ψ∗ ←< ψ∗1, . . . , ψ∗n >, for i ∈ n.
ψ′ =
∑
ψ∗i
ψ ← ψ′(1) mod 2
3.3.1.1 Correctness
We first prove the correctness of the squashed algorithm by rounding off the noise.
Our algorithm has assumption likes:
ψ∗i = zi · si
= ψi · yi · si
= ψi · ui · si/2κ
= ψi · xi/2κ
= ψi ·
2κ × wi/d
2κ
= ψi × wi/d
Hence, the algorithm is correct.
Next, we recall the definition of the permitted polynomial. When considering the
noise, we will prove the scheme is correct for the set C(PE) of circuit that computes
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permitted polynomial.
Lemma 3.3.1. The squashed scheme is correct for the set C(PE) of the circuit that
computed permitted polynomial. For every ciphertext (ψ, zi) that is generated by eval-
uating a permitted polynomial, it holds that [si · zi] is within 1/2.
Proof. Fix a permitted polynomial P (x1, . . . , xt) ∈ PE , an arithmetic circuit C can
compute P , and t fresh ciphertext c1, . . . , ct that encrypts the input into C. Denote
ψ = Evaluate(pk, C, c1, . . . , ct). Meanwhile, fix the public key and the secret key with
respect to security parameter λ. For each i ∈ n, we have yi =< yi,1, . . . , yi,Θ > as the
integer vectors in the public key and si =< si,1, . . . , si,Θ > as binary vectors in the
secret key. From the above assumption, we need to prove [ψi ·wi/d] = [zi ·si] (mod 2).
Recall zi ← [ψi · yi] with φ = dlog2(σ + 1)e bits after binary point for each zi. We
have [ψi · yi] = zi−∆i, since ∆i has φ bits after binary point, so the maximum bits of
∆i is φ+ 1 = dlog2(σ + 1)e+ 1, |∆i| ≤ 2−(φ+1) ≤ 2−(dlog2(σ+1)e+1) ≤ 1/2(σ + 1).
[ψi · wi/d− zi · si] = [ψi · wi/d− si · (ψi · yi)− si ·∆i]
= [ψi · wi/d− ψi · (si · yi)− si ·∆i]
= [ψi · wi/d− ψi · (wi/d−∆d)− si ·∆i]
= [ψi · wi/d− ψi · wi/d+ ψi ·∆d − si ·∆i]
= [ψi ·∆d − si ·∆i]
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Recall [si × yi] = (wi/d)−∆d with ∆d ≤ 2−κ. We have
|[ψi ·∆d − si ·∆i]| ≤ |[ψi ·∆d|+ |si ·∆i]|
≤ 2γ+η · 2−κ + σ · 1
2(σ + 1)
= 2γ+η−κ + σ · 1
2(σ + 1)
= 2−1−φ + σ · 1
2(σ + 1)
<
1
2(σ + 1)
+
σ
2(σ + 1)
= 1/2
Therefore, the claim follows.
3.3.2 Bootstrapping
In this section, we will prove the squashed scheme is bootstrappable. From Gentry’s
idea [26], our scheme can achieve fully homomorphic for circuit of any depth.
Theorem 3.3.2. [26] Let E be the scheme above, and let DE be the set of augmented
(squashed) decryption circuits. Then, DE ⊂ C(PE).
Proof. To prove E is bootstrappable, we need to show the modified decryption m ←∑
[zi ·si](1) mod 2 is a permitted polynomial size circuit. Recall si =< si,1, . . . , si,Θ >
for each i ∈ n are binary number vectors and each si,j is a bit, similarly, zi =<
zi,1, . . . , zi,Θ > for each i ∈ n are rational number vectors and each zi,j is rational
number in [0, 2), keeping φ = dlog(σ+ 1)e bits of precision after the binary point. We
also proved
∑
[si · zi] is within 1/2, and the Hamming weight is σ of the bits si for
each i. The computation algorithm of the decryption can be split into four steps:
• Step 1: For i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and j ∈ {1, . . . ,Θ}, set ai.j ← si,j ·zi,j. ai,j = zi,j when
si,j = 1 and ai,j = 0 when si,j = 0, with φ = dlog(σ + 1)e bits of precision after
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the binary point in binary representation. Set the vectors ai =< ai,1, . . . , ai,Θ >.
• Step 2: Set the vectors xj =
∑
aj for each i ∈ n.
• Step 3: For each i ∈ n, from the Θ rational numbers {xj}Θj=1, generate other
φ + 1 rational numbers {yt}Θ+1t=1 , each yt has less than φ bits of precision, and
satisfy
∑
j xj =
∑
t yt mod 2
• Step 4: Output m←
∑
t yt(1) mod 2
Step 1 and 2 require only constant depth, because when adding vectors, there is no
expensive carry operations needed. For step 3, we will apply the grade-school addition
to handle the carries, and the carries are constant-depth. The last step, we can just
use the a constant depth circuit having polynomial fan-in add-gates and constant fan-
in mult-gates. Therefore, the total degree of the squashed scheme depends on the
decryption polynomial in the binary representation.
From [29], the bound of the noise in the evaluated ciphertext is rEva ≤ (rEnc)d×
√
m,
where d is the degree of the polynomial and m is the number of monomials. for
elementary symmetric polynomials with the degree of d, the number of monomials is
m =
∏blog2 dc
i=0
(
d
2i
)
∼ 2m
′
. To guarantee the ciphertext is inside the decryption radius
of the secret key, we have
(rEnc)
d
√
m = (nρ2ζ)d
√
m ≤ 2η. (3.1)
The degree of the permitted polynomial is d ≤ (η − m′/2)/(log (nρ2ζ)). From the
result in [26], we need to support the degree of the polynomial up to d, then we have
η ≥ d · log (nρ2ζ) + log
√
m to evaluate the ”squashed decryption circuit” for deep
enough circuits.
3.4. Attacks 50
3.3.3 Security of The Squashed Scheme
The security of the squashed scheme is based on the sub set sum problem. To recover
the secret key, the attacker has to find all the coefficient of wi. Since we public
the polynomial vectors instead of ideal lattice, the attacker is not able to recover wi
correctly. The brute force attack on chosen cipertext can achieve the goal. To solve
the n different t, the complexity is
(
σ
t
)n
[50].
3.4 Attacks
The SHE and FHE is secure against chosen plaintext attacks. But no SHE and FHE
scheme can be IND-CCA2 secure, based on the fact that the adversary is allowed to
manipulate the challenged ciphertext and submit it to the decryption oracle in an IND-
CCA2 attack. The IND-CCA1 has been proved to be not secure for FHE and SHE
scheme [39]. Zhang provided a way to recovery the secret key by using the decryption
oracle over the DGHV scheme [65] [66]. Chenal gave more algorithm to allow an
adversary to recover the pubic keys through decryption oracle queries [11]. Since the
scheme based on the two cryptosystem: ideal lattice based system and integer based
system. We consider the attacks on the approximate-gcd problem [35] and the BDD
problem[38].
3.4.1 Brute Force Attack
The simplest attack is brute force attack on the noise in the public key. Since the
ciphertext is protected by noise, this attack will guess the possible noise to recover
the secret key. Since each public key πi = gi × v + ri, the v can be computed by
v = gcd(π1−r1, . . . , π2β−r2β). The scheme needs the number of possible ri more than
2λ to against the attack. The Stehle-Zimmermann algorithm to compute the GCD’s
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told us, the time complexity of the algorithm is Õ(γ + η) for the norm of the vectors
of γ + η bits. The attack complexity is ρ · Õ(γ + η). Therefore, the attack is thwarted
when ρ = ω(log λ).
3.4.2 Birthday Attack
To resist the birthday attack on our scheme, the running time of the attaack needs to
be greater than 2log ρ/2 [29]. So the bit length of the noise has to be at least 2λ bits to
against this attack, and the possible numbers of the noise relative to a single key is at
least 2λ/2.
3.4.3 SDA-Simultaneous Diophantine Approximation
In this section, we start with the know attack based on AGCD problem. To solve
the AGCD problem with many numbers, we can apply simultaneous Diophantine
approximation (SDA) [37]. The element in our variant is polynomial vector rather
than single integer, we can not apply the SDA directly. Fortunately, the coefficient
of each polynomial is integer, then we can modify the SDA to find the target vector.
First, we generate a lattice L(B) by spanning the rows with k + t ≤ 2β public keys.
B =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
θMultρ · In Rot(π2) Rot(π3) . . . Rot(πk+t)
0 −Rot(π1) 0 . . . 0
0 0 −Rot(π1) . . . 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 0 . . . −Rot(π1)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
For π1 = r1 +g1 and πi = ri+gi where 1 ≤ i ≤ k+ t, we have πig1−π1gi = rig1− r1gi.
Then we can apply LLL reduction algorithm to find the vector u =< θ · ρg1, r1g1 −
r1g1, r2g1 − r1g2, . . . , rk+tg1 − r1gk+t >=< θMult · ρ · g1, r1g1( r2r1 −
g2
g1
), r1g1(
r3
r1
−
g3
g1
), . . . , r1g1(
rk+t
r1
− gk+t
g1
) >. Once the attacker find the vector u, they can recover all
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ri.
The attack problem comes to the lattice reduction problem. Based on the lattice
reduction algorithm [9], the target vector u cannot be found if λ2(L(B))‖u‖ < c
n(k+t), where
c is a constant reached to the smallest value of 1.009 [9].
From the definition of successive minima λ2 ≤ (nn/2 det(L)/λ1)
1
(n−1) [58], we have
λ2 ≤
√
n(k + t)
n(k+t)
n(k+t)−1 (det(L)‖u‖ )
1
n(k+t)−1 . If
√
n(k + t)
n(k+t)
n(k+t)−1 det(B)
1
n(k+t)−1 < cn(k+t)
‖u‖
n(k+t)
n(k+t)−1 , the target vector u cannot be computed by lattice reduction. Briefly,
to guarantee ‖u‖ is hard to be found, we need the matrix satisfy the condition of
det(B) < c(n(k+t))(n(k+t)−1)‖u‖n(k+t). Since det(B) = (θρ)n‖π1‖k+t−1, therefore we can
get det(B) ≤ (θρ)n(θ · ‖g1‖ · ‖v‖)n(k+t−1). As ‖u‖ > θ · ρ · ‖g1‖, the successful at-
tack achieves when (θρ)n(θ‖g1‖‖v‖)n(k+t−1) ≥ c(n(k+t))(n(k+t)−1)(θ · ρ · ‖g1‖)n(k+t) ≥
cn
2(k+t)2(θ · ρ · ‖g1‖)n(k+t). We conclude an inequation as :
η(k + t− 1) ≥ n(k + t)2 log2 c+ γ + (k + t− 1) log2 ρ, (3.2)
and
log2 c ≤
(η − log2 ρ)(k + t− 1)− γ
n(k + t)2
. (3.3)
To get the right hand side maximum, we need to find the maximum value of
η − log2 ρ
n(k + t)
− η − log2 ρ− γ
n(k + t)2
,
since log2 ρ is quite small compared with η, which means k + t ∼ O(γη ) gives the best
attack.
In our parameter setting, k + t ∼ O(γ
η
). To resist the modified SDA attack, our
numbers of public key has to satisfy γ
η
> 2β. The attacker can use all public keys to
give themselves best advantage. For 2β ≥ γ
η
, the time to get a 2η approximation is
2γ/η. Therefore to thwart this attack, we need γ/η = ω(log λ). The setting of γ is
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γ = ω(η log λ).
3.4.4 Nguyen and Stern’s Orthogonal Lattice
Using Nguyen and Stern’s orthogonal lattice [45] is another way to operate lattice
attack. The attacker will be failure if the dimension of the lattice is larger than the
ratio of the bit length of the public key and the bit length of secret key k+t > (γ+η)/η,
more precisely, the target vector will not be covered when k + t > (γ + η)/(η − logρ2).
The time complexity is roughly 22γ/η
2
.
We generate the lattice spanned by the row of the following (t + k) × (t + k + 1)
matrix:
B =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Rot(π1) R1In
Rot(π2) R2In
...
. . .
Rot(πk+t) Rk+tIn
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
The row (i) represents the constraint Rot(πi)−riIn = 0 mod V , where Ri is an upper
bound on |ri|. Let the vector v =< v0, v1, . . . , vβ >=
∑k+t
i=1 giBin, for n ∈ 1, . . . , n in
the lattice above. We obtain
v0 −
k+t∑
i=1
vi
Ri
· ri =
k+t∑
i=1
gi(Rot(πi)− riIn) = 0 mod V.
The vector are orthogonal to (1,− r1
R1
,− r2
R2
, · · · − rk+t
Rk+t
) by lattice reduction algorithm,
then the noise ri can be recovered.
The determinant of the lattice is approximately to the product of the columns
of B, which is
√
k + t‖Rot(πi)‖
∏k+t
i=1 Ri ≈
√
k + t‖Rot(Πi)‖Rk+ti , where ‖Rot(Πi)‖
is the upper bound of ‖Rot(πi)‖. Therefore, we have R k+t
√
Π < σρ, where k + t >
(γ + η)/(η − log2 ρ). The parameter to against the know attack will be similar as the
SDA attack.
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3.4.5 Coppersmith’s Method
We consider the Coppersmith’s technique [14] to attack on recovering the noise of
public keys. Coppersmith’s method does not only focus on the relations Rot(πi) −
riIn = 0 mod V , but also consider the relations like (Rot(πi) − riIn)2 = 0 mod V ,
or (Rot(πi) − riIn) × (Rot(πi)′ − r′iIn) = 0 mod V . The lattice will be generated as
follow. We still set Π as the bound of the public key and R is the bound of noise, and
let all πi,j are roughly the same size Π. The first row of the matrix has size Õ(Πd),
d is the relations of product, where d ≤ 2β. The next 2β rows has size Õ(Πd−1R) on
the pivots position. In general case, on the pivots position, there are
(
2β+d−1
d
)
rows of
the size Õ(Πd−iRi). Remaining rows are the size of Õ(Rd).
The determinant of the lattice det(B) ≈ Π2 · (ΠR)2β · (R2)(
2β
2 )−1 = Π2+2βR4τ−2.
The attacker will take the best advantage if 2β ≤ (γ − ρ)/(η − ρ). To against the
attack, we need to choose the number of public key 2β > (γ − ρ)/(η − ρ) ∼ O(γ/η).
which is also close to the previous attack.
3.4.6 BDD-Bounded Distance Decoding
We will use BDD problem to recover the random vectors u ←< 1, s1, s1, . . . , sβ >.
This is the know message attack to find the shortest vector by lattice reduction. By
using the ciphertext, the matrix generate as follow:
B =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
1 0 0 0 . . . 0 ψ
0 In 0 0 . . . 0 Rot(π1 × π1)
0 0 In 0 . . . 0 Rot(π1 × π2)
...
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
0 0 0 0 . . . In Rot(πβ × πβ)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
.
As previously, det(Rot(π1)) ≤ ‖π1‖n ≤ (σ‖g1‖‖v‖)n, therefore, det(B) ≤ ‖ψ‖ +
τ(θ2‖g1‖‖v‖‖g2‖‖v‖)n, and ‖u‖ = 1 + (τ + 1)ζ. From the Minkowski bounds, we relax
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the condition to against the best lattice reduction, we have
2 log2 θ + 2γ + 2η < τ(nτ + 1) log2 c+ τ log2(1 + τζ). (3.4)
The number of public key has to be n · τ + 1 to against the known attack.
3.5 Extension of The HIL Encryption to Higher
Degree
In the section 4, we use a quadratic form to compute ciphertext instead of linear form.
Due to reduce the number of public key, the significant benefit of this scheme is reduce
the size of the public key. Followed by this idea, we modified the scheme further by
higher degree t of the encryption procedure, c←
∑β
i1,...,it=1
si1,...,it×πi1×πi2 · · ·×πit +
sτ+1. The key point is to prove the hash function family Ht with h : Z(nβ)
t → Zn
is almost a pairwise independent hash function family, then it is suitable to apply a
variant of leftover hash lemma. The constraint will be βt ≥ γ + η + ω(log λ).
To get the decryption correctly, we also need rEnc = θ
t · ρt · ζ < 2η, and rEnc =
√
m(θt · ρt · ζ)` < 2η for bootstrapping. We consider the constant factor m · θ as small
number, so rEnc requires
√
m · θt(ρt · ζ)` < 2η. To against the known attack, we need
γ to satisfy the equation
γ ≥ (η − log2 ρ)(tβ − 1)− n(tβ)2 log2 c, (3.5)
and
t log2 γm + tγ + tη < τ(nτ + 1) log2 c+ τ log2(1 + τζ). (3.6)
We set a convenient parameter set as: ρ = λ, ζ = λ, η = O(λ2 logk λ2), γ =
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O(λ3 logk λ3), t = log λ and τ = βt = O(λ3/t logk λ3/t). Now, we store β = O(λ3/t logk λ3/t)
integers. Hence, the public key size becomes O(λ4 logk λ4) rather than O(λ6 logk λ6)
in the original scheme.
Table 3.1: Comparisons between Quadratic and Higher Degree
Quadratic Higher Degree
Columns 2 t = log λ
Numbers of PK in Each Column β = O(λ2 logk λ2) β = O(λlog λ logk λlog λ)
Total Numbers of PK 2 · β = O(λ2 logk λ2) t · β = O(log λ · λlog λ logk λlog λ)
PK Size O(λ6 logk λ6) O(λ4 logk λ4)
3.6 Parameters and Constraints
We choose parameters under the following constraints:
• ρ = ω(log λ) to avoid brute force attack on noise.
• η ≥ log (nρ2ζ) · Θ(λ/ log λ) to support the evaluation of squashed decryption
circuits.
• γ = ω(η · λ) to against lattice-based attacks.
• β2 ≥ log (γ + η) + ω(log λ) to use the leftover hash lemma in the reduction to
approximate common vector.
• ζ = ω(log λ) for secondary noise parameter.
• n = ω(λ log λ) to foils lattice-based reduction [29] and θ =
√
n [26].
We set a convenient parameter set as: ρ = λ, ζ = λ, η = O(λ2 logk λ2), γ =
O(λ3 logk λ3) and τ = β2 = O(λ3 logk λ3). The main difference is that instead of hav-
ing τ = O(λ logk λ) integers, we store β = O(λ1.5 logk λ1.5) integers. Hence, the public
key size becomes O(λ4.5 logk λ4.5) rather than O(λ6 logk λ6) in the original scheme.
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We will use λ = 80 as an example to compare the new scheme and the initial
scheme. Under the assumption that the dimension of the lattice is the square root of
the dimension of the normal lattice.
Table 3.2: The Relations between Degree of Decryption Polynomial and Number of
Monomials
Degree of Decryption Polynomial Number of Monomials
3 = 22 − 1 9
7 = 23 − 1 5145
15 = 24 − 1 ∼ 234
31 = 25 − 1 ∼ 275
63 = 26 − 1 ∼ 2176
. . . . . .
1023 = 210 − 1 ∼ 23180
In this case, it requires the lattice with dimension 31 (From the Table 1) to be
large enough to resist the lattice reduction. To resist birthday paradox attack, the
maximum norm of each noise is
√
32. s has τ + 1 blocks, to stop the brute force
attack, we set maximum 5 blocks with nonzero entries besides the τ -th block. So we
can find the number of public key used in the encryption scheme. The total sample is
at least
(
τ+1
5
)
(
(
n
2
)
22)5 > 280, which is τ = 111. We keep the same security level of the
squashed secret key by Θ = 6 and σ = 1. We set maximum 11 coefficient to be 1 or
−1 , for rEnc, the maximum norm of the noise in each ciphertext is 32 ·
√
11
3 ∼ 210.
Here, we use the suggestion in [29], the expansion factor for production of two random
vectors is much small, we can consider ‖v1 × v2‖ ≈ ‖v1‖ · ‖v2‖ for our example in the
bootstrapping. The worst case occurs when rEnc = 2
10. To achieve the bootstrapping,
η has to satisfy the equation [1]: 2η ≥
√
275(210)31, therefore, η = 348. According to
the know attack, we choose γ = 7090 as the smallest value to satisfy equation [5], [6]
which guarantee the scheme is secure.
In our SHE scheme, the ciphertext size is (348 + 7090) × 31 ∼ 225Kb, the public
key space is (348 + 7090)× 31× 22 ∼ 4.8Mb. In the squashed scheme, the public key
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size is (348 + 7090) × 31 × 6 ∼ 1.3Mb, the secret key size is 225 × 31 × 6 ∼ 40.9Mb.
The whole scheme with the public key size is 4.8+1.3+40.9 = 47Mbits which is much
smaller than the original scheme with 173.5Mbits.
Table 3.3: Comparisons with Original HIL Scheme
Initial Scheme Qaudratic Higher Degree
Key Columns 1 2 t = log λ
Security Parameter λ = 80 λ = 80 λ = 80
Lattice Dimension n = 31 n = 31 n = 31
Public Key Size 173.5 Mb 47 Mb 40.4 Mb
Ciphertext Size 573 Kb 225 Kb 202.8 Kb
Chapter 4
Conclusion and Future Work
The theory includes the basic notions of lattices, the computational problems of lat-
tices, lattices basis reduction, the average-case hardness to worst-case hardness reduc-
tion, and the one-way trapdoor function from lattices. Moreover, the knowledge of
ideal lattice is essential. The technique of lattice provides us the fundamental mathe-
matical knowledge to carry out the research. Buy analyzing the existing fully homo-
morphic encryption schemes: security model, construction, functionality, and proof of
technique. There are three categories of fully homomorphic encryption scheme: ideal
lattice based scheme, integer based scheme and LWE based scheme. The construction
of schemes are based on some mathematic tools: integer ring, polynomial ring, lattice,
and ideal lattice.
By summarizing the result of the current works, we realized the efficiency of the
fully homomorphic encryption scheme can be improved by reducing the key size. So
we focus on how to apply the technique on reducing the key size especially the public
key. We also identified that not all three categories can achieve this goal by the
same technique. Therefore, the research aims to apply the public key compressing on
different schemes and also applied on the batching schemes.
To answer the question is: how to reducing the size of public key in somewhat
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homomorphic encryption? We use the same way to construct fully homomorphic
encryption schemes. First, to construct somewhat homomorphic encryption and then
use the bootstrapping to achieve fully homomorphic encryption schemes. That means,
we have to make sure our somewhat homomorphic scheme is correct, then we can apply
squashing and bootstrapping. We construct the squashed scheme which needs to do
the ”post process” on the ciphertext. The scheme will use a pseudo-random generator
to generate public key. The ciphertext expansion will be generated by pseudo-random
generator again. Next, to prove the correctness, the decryption, the addition and the
multiplication. The attack will be the same as somewhat homomorphic encryption.
To answer the second question: How to construct a more efficient scheme based on
the existing scheme with new technique? We focus on applying the public key com-
pressing on the batching schemes to improve the efficiency of the fully homomorphic
encryption. We will try to batch Plantard, Susilo and Zhang’s scheme. Then the
scheme can encrypt a plaintext vector rather than single bit. If the goal is achieved,
then we can apply the public key compression to see if the scheme has better key size
with less time consuming. The correctness and security need to be proved, the known
attack should be analyzed as well.
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